Build the platform identity and attestation sequence
Connect roots of trust, secure boot, measured boot, TPM evidence, component identity, and verifier policy without collapsing them together.
Depends on: AIINFRA-002
Outcome
Learners can explain what each trust mechanism proves, what it does not prove, and how evidence moves from boot-time measurement to a fleet admission decision.
Deliverables
- Separate device identity, firmware authenticity, measured state, authorization, and health.
- Trace PCR extension, event logs, quotes, freshness, endorsement chains, and verifier appraisal.
- Compare host, BMC, NIC/DPU, drive, and accelerator trust boundaries.
- Explain certificate enrollment, provisioning, rotation, revocation, and recovery.
- Include adversarial cases and ambiguous evidence.
Acceptance criteria
- Secure boot and measured boot are never presented as interchangeable.
- The verifier checks freshness and recomputes measurements from the event log.
- Multi-component ownership and reset boundaries are explicit.
- Failure handling covers both compromise and ordinary service events.